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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between product market com-
petition (PMC) and innovation. A Schumpeterian growth model is devel-
oped in which …rms innovate ‘step-by-step’, and where both technological
leaders and their followers engage in R&D activities. In this model, com-
petition may increase the incremental pro…t from innovating; on the other
hand, competition may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards. This
model generates four main predictions which we test empirically. First, the
relationship between product market competition (PMC) and innovation is
an inverted U-shape: the escape competition e¤ect dominates for low ini-
tial levels of competition, whereas the Schumpeterian e¤ect dominates at
higher levels of competition. Second, the equilibrium degree of technologi-
cal ‘neck-and-neckness’ among …rms should decrease with PMC. Third, the
higher the average degree of ‘neck-and-neckness’ in an industry, the steeper
the inverted-U relationship between PMC and innovation in that industry.
Fourth, …rms may innovate more if subject to higher debt-pressure, espe-
cially at lower levels of PMC. We confront these four predictions with a
new panel data set on UK …rms’ patenting activity at the US patenting of-
…ce. The inverted U relationship, the neck and neck, and the debt pressure
predictions are found to accord well with observed behavior in the data.
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Economists have long been interested in the relationship between product market
competition (PMC) and innovation. Both the theoretical IO and the more re-
cent endogenous growth literatures tackle the issue. The standard IO literature2
predicts that innovation should decline with competition, as more competition
reduces the monopoly rents that reward entry by new successful innovators. How-
ever, empirical work such as Geroski (1994), Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Gri¢th
and Van Reenen (1999) has pointed to a positive correlation between product
market competition and innovative output. Several theoretical attempts have
been made to reconcile the Schumpeterian paradigm with the evidence provided
in these studies, generating various predictions as to the shape of the relation-
ship between PMC and innovation.3A …rst attempt, in Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey
(1999), introduced the “competition as an incentive mechanism” argument in
Hart (1983) into a Schumpeterian growth framework. This approach would still
predict a monotonic relationship between PMC and innovation. This would be
negative if most …rms are value-maximizing and positive if most …rms are gov-
erned by “satis…cing” managers who mainly care about the …rm remaining in
1Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank Daron Acemoglu, Tim Bresnahan,
Wendy Carlin, Paul David, Janice Eberly, Dennis Ranque, Robert Solow, Manuel Trajtenberg,
Alwyn Young, John Van Reenen and participants at the CIAR seminar for their comments.
Financial support for this project was provided by the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic
Analysis of Fiscal Policy at the IFS. The data was developed with funding from the Leverhulme
Trust.
2See, inter alia, Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980) and also the …rst generation of Schumpeterian
growth models (Aghion-Howitt (1992), Caballero-Ja¤e (1993)).
3See Aghion-Howitt (1998), Chapter 7, for a survey of some of these these attempts.
2business. In addition, this model would predict substitutability between PMC
and debt-…nancing together with hard budget constraints, in the sense that more
debt-…nancing in a hard budget environment could substitute forPMC in inducing
otherwise reluctant managers to innovate more frequently in order to keep their
…rm a‡oat. This latter …nding has been questioned however in recent empirical
work by Grosfeld-Tressel (2001) and Aghion-Carlin-Scha¤er (2002).
An alternative approach, introduced by Aghion-Harris-Vickers (1997) and sub-
sequently analyzed in Aghion-Harris-Howitt-Vickers (2001), extends the basic
Schumpeterian model by allowing incumbent …rms to innovate. In these mod-
els, innovation incentives depend not so much upon post-innovation rents per se,
but more upon the di¤erence between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents
(the latter were equal to zero in the basic model where all innovations were made
by outsiders). In this case, more PMC may end up fostering innovations and
growth as it may reduce a …rm’s pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces its
post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental
pro…ts from innovating, and thereby encourage R&D investments aimed at “es-
caping competition”; and it will do so to a larger extent in more “neck-and-neck”
industries, that is in industries in which oligopolistic …rms face more similar pro-
duction costs; the …rm with lower (resp. higher) unit costs is referred to as the
technological leader (resp. follower) in the corresponding industry.
In this framework …rms innovate in order to reduce production costs, and
they do it “step-by-step”, in the sense that a laggard …rm in any industry must
…rst catch up with the technological leader before becoming itself a leader in the
3future. In neck-and-neck industries competition is particularly intense and it is
also in those industries that the “escape competition” e¤ect pointed out above
is strongest. On the other hand, in less neck-and-neck, or more “unleveled”, in-
dustries, more competition may also reduce innovation as the laggard’s reward
to catching up with the technological leader may fall (this is a “Schumpeterian
e¤ect” of the kind emphasized in the earlier models). Finally, by increasing in-
novation incentives relatively more in neck-and-neck industries than in unleveled
industries, an increase in product market competition will tend to reduce the
fraction of neck-and-neck industries in the economy; this “composition e¤ect” re-
inforces the Schumpeterian e¤ect in inducing a negative correlation between PMC
and aggregate productivity growth or the aggregate rate of innovations.
The paper begins with the derivation of four main empirical predictions of
this “step-by-step innovation” model, which we then confront with data from a
panel of UK …rms. We argue that the changes in product market competition
and the extensive level of patenting across industries over the last thirty years in
the UK make it a particularly interesting environment to assess these predictions.
The …rst prediction is that the relationship between PMC and innovation is an
inverted-U shape: that is, the escape competition e¤ect tends to dominate for low
initial levels of competition, whereas the Schumpeterian e¤ect tends to dominate
at higher levels of PMC. This prediction is in line with an earlier conjecture by
Scherer (1965). The second prediction is that the equilibrium degree of neck-
and-neckness should decrease with PMC, as more PMC will increase innovation
incentives comparatively more in neck-and-neck sectors, thereby reducing the ex-
4pected time interval during which an industry remains “neck-and-neck”. Third,
the higher the average degree of neck-and-neckness of an economy, the stronger
the escape competition e¤ect will be on average and therefore the steeper the pos-
itive part of the inverted-U relationship between PMC and innovation. Fourth,
this model predicts that the escape competition e¤ect should also be stronger
in industries where …rms’ managers face harder budget constraints. As a result,
…rms with higher debt/cash-‡ow ratios may innovate more for any level of PMC.
These predictions are examined across a range of industries drawn from a …rm
panel for the UK. The data are on UK listed …rms over the period 1968-1996
and include information on costs, sales, investments and the number of successful
patent applications at the US patent o¢ce. Detailed information on citations are
used to weight ourmeasure of patents granted foreach …rmin each year. Wederive
a measure of product market competition using a Lerner index. A sequence of
competition policy reforms, that di¤er in their impact across industries, are used
to argue that the Lerner index provides a reliable measure of changes in product
market competition over the period we study. These policy reforms are further
used as instruments to control for the potential endogeneity in the Lerner index.
Within each industry we construct a measure of the size of technology gap (degree
of neck and neckness) based on the dispersion of …rm level technology and cost
indicators. We have matched information at the industry level from the US and
other OECD countries which we use to provide further exogenous instruments for
the technological gap between leaders and followers across industries. Finally, the
long time series on …rms in each industry allow us to control for industry level
5e¤ects as well as common time e¤ects that plague cross-section and time series
analyses of these relationships.
The theoretical discussion provides a speci…cation for the average arrival rate
of innovations in an industry according to the level of product market compe-
tition and the degree of neck-and-neckness. Our empirical speci…cation starts
with a model for the hazard rate for patenting and uses this to derive a gen-
eralised Poisson model for the count of patents, which is our main measure of
innovative activity. Since we are interested in investigating whether there is a
non-monotonic relationship between innovation and product market competition
we adopt a semiparametric approach and begin our analysis using a hazard rate
speci…cation which is an exponential polynomial spline function in our compe-
tition measure. As part of this empirical investigation we …nd an exponential
quadratic model …ts the data extremely well once industry and time e¤ects are
allowed for.
A striking …nding is of a strong inverted U relationship. This single peaked
relationship is robust to many alternative speci…cations and to the endogeneity
of the Lerner index. Controlling for endogeneity and including time and industry
e¤ects shifts the peak toward the competitive direction but still suggests the
importance of the Schumpeterian e¤ect for alarge minority of …rms and industries.
This inverted U relationship continues to hold when we split by the degree of
neck-and-neckness. It is robust to controlling for …rm size and for …xed capital
costs. This inverted U relationship is also found in the data for many individual
industries.
6The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
theoretical framework. Section 3 derives our main predictions analytically in the
special case of a maximum technological gap equal to one. Section 3 simulates the
general model with unbounded gaps. Section 4 concludes the theoretical part by
summarizing our main empirical predictions. Section 5 provides a description of
the data and assesses the degree to which the variables used are likely to provide
good measures of their theoretical counterparts developed in the earlier sections of
the paper. In section 6 we present our main empirical …ndings. We …rst analyze
the robustness of the inverted U relationship and then go on to examine how
this relationship varies with the size of the technology gap between …rms within
the industry (the degree of neck and neckness) and with debt pressure. We …nd
a strong accordance between the main theoretical predictions and the empirical
results. Section 7 provides a short summary and concludes with directions for
further research.
2. A theoretical framework
2.1. Consumers





7where each xi is an aggregate of two goods produced by duopolists in sector i;4
de…ned by the subutility function:
xi = v(xAi;xBi)
where v is homogeneous of degree one and symmetric in its two arguments. We








where a higher ®i 2 (0;1] re‡ects a higher degree of substitutability between the
two inputs in industry i.
The log-preference assumption made in (2.1) implies that in equilibrium indi-
viduals spend the same amount on each basket xi. We normalize this common
amount to unity by using expenditure as the numeraire for the prices pAi and
pBi at each date. Thus the representative household chooses each xAi and xBi to
maximize v(xAi;xBi) subject to the budget constraint: pAixAi + pBixBi = 1:
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For notational simplicity we suppress the notation for the industry index i from
here on.
4See Aghion-Howitt (2002) for variants of this model with N …rm- industries and free entry.
82.2. Technology levels, R&D and innovations
Each …rm produces using labor as the only input,5 according to a constant-returns
production function, and takes the wage rate as given. Thus the unit costs of
production cA and cB of the two …rms in an industry are independent of the
quantities produced. Now, let k denote the technology level of duopoly …rm j in
some industry i; that is, one unit of labor currently employed by …rm j generates
an output ‡ow equal to:
Aj = °
kj; j = A;B; (2.4)
where ° > 1 is a parameter that measures the size of a leading-edge innovation;
(equivalently, it takes °¡kj units of labor for …rm j to produce one unit of output).
An industry is then fully characterized by a pair of integers (l;m), where l is the
leaders technology and mis the technology gap of the leader over the follower. We
de…ne ¼m(respectively ¼¡m) to be the equilibrium pro…t ‡ow of a …rm m steps
ahead of (respectively behind) its rival.6
For expositional simplicity we shall …rst concentrate on the simple case where
knowledge spillovers between leader and follower are such that the maximum sus-
tainable gap is m = 1: That is, if a …rm is one step ahead and it innovates the
5In Aghion et al (2001) we argue that the model can be easily extended to the case where










where Aj measured labor productivity in …rm j and is mutiplied by ° > 1 each time …rm j
innovates.
6The above logarithmic technology along with the cost structure c(x) = x:°¡k implies that
the pro…t in the industry depends only on the gap m between the leader and follower, and not
on absolute levels of technology.
9follower will automatically copy the leader’s previous technology and so remain
only one step ahead. Therefore, in that case, given that pro…tability is only de-
pendent on the gap between leader and follower, no innovation will be undertaken
by the leader. At any point in time there will therefore be two types of sectors in
the economy: leveled sectors where …rms are neck and neck, that is m = 0, and
unleveled sectors where one …rm is leading the other in the same industry, with
m = 1.
We denote by Ã(n) =
1
2¯n2 the R&D cost (in units of labour) of a leader (resp.
follower) …rm moving one technological step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate of
n7. Let nm denote the research intensity put up by each …rm in an industry with
technological gap m, and let n¡m denote the innovation rate or R&D intensity of
the follower in such an industry.
2.3. Bellman equations
Let Vm denote the steady state value of being currently a leader (or follower if
m < 0) in an industry with technology gap m, and let w denote the wage rate,
which we take as given assuming an in…nitely elastic supply of labour. We then
have the following Bellman equations:
rVm = ¼m + nm(Vm+1 ¡ Vm) + n¡m(Vm¡1 ¡ Vm) ¡ w¯(nm)
2=2;
rV¡m = ¼¡m + nm(V¡m¡1 ¡ V¡m) + n¡m(V¡m+1 ¡ V¡m) ¡ w¯(n¡m)
2=2;
7In Aghion et al (2001) we analyze a di¤erent model in which the laggard in an industry
with technological gap m catches up immediately with the technological leader whenever she
innovates, thereby reducing her unit labor cost by °¡m: This alternative formulation however
tends to exaggerate the importance of the ”escape competition” e¤ect and to downplay the
schumpeterian e¤ect of PMC.
10rV0 = ¼0 + n0(V1 ¡ V0) + n0(V¡1 ¡V0) ¡w¯(n0)
2=2;
In words, the annuity value rVm of currently being a technological leader in an
industry with gap m at date t equals the current pro…t ‡ow ¼m minus the current
R&D cost (w¯nm
2=2)dt, plus the discounted expected capital gain nm(Vm+1¡Vm)
from making an innovation and thereby moving one further step ahead of the
follower, minus the discounted expected capital loss n¡m(Vm¡1¡Vm) from having
the follower catch up by one step with the leader. The equation for the annuity
value of a follower is similarly explained. Finally, in the Bellman equation for a
neck-and-neck …rm, note that if each …rm only takes into account its own cost of
R&D, in symmetric Nash equilibrium both R&D e¤orts are equal.
Now, using the fact that each …rm chooses its own R&D e¤ort to maximize its
current value, i.e to maximize the RHS of the corresponding Bellman equation,
we obtain the …rst order conditions:
¯wnm = Vm+1 ¡ Vm;¯wn¡m = V¡(m¡1) ¡ V¡m;
¯wn0 = V1 ¡ V0:
2.4. Product-market competition
Boone (2001) makes the convincing argument that any parameter increase that
would result in increasing the relative pro…t shares of more advanced …rms; that
is the pro…tability of a greater technological lead, would be a suitable measure of
product market competition. Thus one possible (inverse) measure of competition,
especially in the m · 1 case, would be the pro…t ‡ow of “neck-and-neck” …rms,
11¼0; with a higher ¼0 resulting from higher collusion among otherwise similar …rms
in the same sector.
Another potential “measure” of competition from Boone’s theoretical stand-








More speci…cally, assume that in any sector the two duopolists in that sector
compete in prices, arriving at a Bertrand equilibrium. According to the de-
mand functions in (2.3), the elasticity of demand faced by each …rm j is ´j =













; j = A;B: (2.5)







cj; j = A;B (2.6)





¸j (1 ¡ ®)
1 ¡ ®¸j
; j = A;B (2.7)
Equations (2.5) » (2.7) can be solved for unique equilibrium revenues, prices
and pro…ts. Given the degree of substitutability ®; the equilibrium pro…t of each
…rm j is determined by its relative cost z = cj=c¡j; an equiproportional reduction
in both cA and cB would induce each …rm to reduce its price in the same propor-
tion, which, because industry demand is unit-elastic, would leave the equilibrium
12revenues and pro…ts unchanged. More formally, (2.5) » (2.7) implicitly de…ne a
function Á(z;®) such that:
¦A = Á(cA=cB;®) and ¦B = Á(cB=cA;®): (2.8)
The substitutability parameter ® is our measure of the degree of product
market competition in each industry. The limiting case of ® = 0 de…nes the
minimal degree of competition; the opposite limiting case of ® = 1 is the case of
Bertrand competition between undi¤erentiated products, which results in perfect
competition when the two …rms have the same unit cost. Although ® is ostensibly
a taste parameter, it can be shown to satisfy Boone’s requirement.8 Furthermore,
in this model ® corresponds to standard measures of competition. For example,






between the two rivals’ outputs in the industry. Given a …rm’s
share ¸ of industry revenue, ® is also a monotonically increasing transformation
of the elasticity of demand
1¡®¸
1¡® faced by the …rm. Furthermore, given a …rm’s






In our empirical analysis, we shall use the Lerner index itself as a measure of
PMC, being aware that this index also depends upon the …rm’s market share ¸9.
8See Aghion et al (2001) for a formal proof.
9The following considerations, suggest that the average Lerner index of a random sample of
…rms in an industry should be a decreasing function of the ® measure of PMC, even after taking
into account the e¤ect of ® on R&D intensities and therefore on average market shares. First,
132.5. The one-step case
In the special case where the maximum technological gap between leaders and
followers is m = 1; assuming for simplicity that w = ¯ = 110, and using the
fact that in that case a technological leader has no incentive to invest in R&D
(n1 = 0); the above Bellman equations become:
rV1 = ¼1 + n¡1(V0 ¡V1)
rV¡1 = ¼¡1 + +n¡1(V0 ¡ V¡1) ¡ (n¡1)
2=2






with corresponding …rst order conditions:
n¡1 = V0 ¡V¡1





Thus, for example, the annuity value rV1 of being a leader is the current ‡ow
of pro…t ¼1 minus the expected capital loss per unit of time from being caught up
with by the laggard. The expected loss is the loss in value V1¡V0 that will occur
if the laggard innovates, multiplied by the ‡ow probability n¡1 of the laggard
innovating.
for ¸ su¢ciently small (which is typically the case in practice), the Lerner index LI is clearly
decreasing in ®; second, we show in the Appendix that for small innovation size ° a …rm’s Lerner
is approximately linear in the …rm’s lead size, so that when averaging across the two …rms in the
same industry, we approximately get the Lerner index of a neck-and-neck …rm (with ¸ = 1=2),
which itself is decreasing in ®; third, when we calculate the expected Lerner index of a randomly
selected …rm under the steady-state distribution of lead size, using the parameters underlying
our simulations in section 4, we again …nd that the average Lerner index is a decreasing function
of ®:
10We thus take the wage rate as given, with the implicit assumption of an in…nitely elastic
supply of labor at wage w = 1: See Aghion et. al (1997) for a discussion of the case where the
supply of labor is inelastic.
142.6. Individual innovation intensities
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) solve for n¡1 and n0: Eliminating the V’s between
these equations yields the reduced form research equations:
(n0)2
2
+ rn0 ¡(¼1 ¡¼0) = 0 (2.12)
(n¡1)2
2




This system is recursive, as the …rst quadratic equation solves for n0; and then
given n0 the second quadratic equation solves for n¡1: We obtain:
n0 = ¡r +
p
r2 + 2(¼1 ¡¼0) (2.14)
n¡1 = ¡(r + n0) +
q
(r + n0)2 + n2
0 + 2(¼0 ¡ ¼¡1): (2.15)
Combining (2.14) and (2.15) yields the alternative expression:
n¡1 = ¡(r + n0) +
q
r2 + (n0)
2 + 2(¼1 ¡ ¼¡1): (2.16)
Here, we shall focus on the e¤ects of an increase in product market competition
as represented by a reduction in ¼0 leaving ¼¡1 and ¼1 unchanged. (The analysis
and results in the remaining part of this section can be replicated using the elas-
ticity parameter ® as an alternative way to parametrize PMC). We immediately
see that n0 increases whereas n¡1 can be shown to fall.11 The latter e¤ect (on n¡1)







r2 + 2(¼1 ¡¼0)
< 0
>From this and (2.16):
15captured by a follower who succeeds in catching-up with its rival by innovating.12
The former e¤ect (on n0) is what we refer to as an “escape competition e¤ect”,
namely that more competition induces neck-and-neck …rms to innovate in order
to escape competition, as the incremental value of getting ahead is increased with
higher PMC. Thus, if we were to treat the fractions of leveled and unleveled sec-
tors in the economy as an exogenous parameter, we would get the conclusion that
the higher the fraction of neck-and-neck sectors in the economy, the more positive
the e¤ect of product market competition on the average innovation rate. This
complementarity between PMC and neck-and-neckness will appear more clearly
in Section 3 below when we simulate the general model with unbounded gaps.
2.7. Average innovation rate
An increase in product market competition will have an ambiguous e¤ect on
the steady-state aggregate innovation rate because it will induce more frequent
innovations in currently neck-and-neck sectors and slower innovations in currently
unleveled sectors. The overall e¤ect on the average innovation rate and on average










2 + 2(¼1 ¡¼¡1)
3
5 > 0
12As we will see when we allow for m arbitrarily large, this Schumpeterian e¤ect may be
counteracted by a “forward looking” escape competition e¤ect. More PMC induces a laggard
in a sector with small technological gap (between the leader and that laggard) to increase its
R&D investment in order to enter the race for a large technological lead sooner. This and the
Schumpeterian e¤ects together give rise to an inverted U-shape relationship between n¡m and
PMC as measured by ® for all m < 0 (see section 3.2 below).
16spends being neck-and-neck.
More formally, let ¹1 (resp. ¹0) denote the steady-state probability of being
an unleveled (resp. neck-and-neck) industry. During any unit time interval, the
steady-state probability that a sector moves from being unleveled to leveled is
¹1n¡1; and the probability that it moves in the opposite direction is 2¹0n0: In
steady state, these two probabilities must be equal:
¹1n¡1 = 2¹0n0:
This, together with the fact that:
¹1 + ¹0 = 1;
implies that the average ‡ow of innovations is:




Figure 1 shows a numerical example in which r = :04;¼¡1 = 0;¼1 = 10;w =
¯ = 1: As ¼0 decreases from ¼ = ¼1; the innovation rate I follows an inverted-U
shaped pattern.
2.8. The logic of the inverse-U
The reason for the inverted-U shape is that when there is not much product
market competition, ¼0 is close to ¼1; so that there is hardly any incentive for
…rms to innovate when the sector is leveled, and the overall innovation rate will be
highest when the sector is unleveled and there is asymmetric competition. Thus
the industry will be quick to leave the unleveled state (which it does as soon as the
17laggard innovates) and slow to leave the leveled state (which won’t happen until
one of the neck-and-neck …rms innovates), and as a result the industry will spend
most of the time in the unleveled state. Hence when competition intensi…es, the
e¤ect on the economy-wide average rate of innovation will be determined by what
happens in the leveled state. But we have seen that the e¤ect of more intense
competition on the innovation rate 2n0 in a leveled industry is positive, since the
“escape competition” e¤ect is at work for …rms in that state. In other words, if
the degree of competition is very low to begin with, an increase will result in a
faster average innovation rate.
On the other hand, when competition is very high, ¼0 is close to ¼¡1 and
there is relatively little incentive for the laggard in an unleveled state to innovate,
especially if the rate of interest is high, because the incremental pro…t is very low.
(Of course there is still an incentive for the laggard to innovate even if ¼0 = ¼¡1;
because, although an innovation will not raise current pro…ts, it will take the …rm
one step closer to possibly attaining a leader’s pro…t ¼1:) Thus the industry will be
relatively slow to leave the unleveled state. Meanwhile the large incremental pro…t
¼1 ¡¼0 gives …rms in the leveled state a relatively large incentive to innovate, so
that the industry will be relatively quick to leave the leveled state. As a result,
the industry will spend most of the time unleveled, so that when competition
intensi…es the e¤ect on the average rate of innovation may be determined by what
happens in the unleveled state. But we have seen that the e¤ect of more intense
competition on the innovation rate in the unleveled state is negative, since the
Schumpeterian e¤ect is at work on the laggard while the leader never innovates.
18In other words, if the degree of competition is very high to begin with, an increase
may result in a slower average innovation rate.
Hence the possibility of an inverse-U relationship between competition and
innovation. When competition is low, an increase will raise innovation through
the escape competition e¤ect on neck-and-neck …rms, but when it becomes intense
enough it may lower innovation through the Schumpeterian e¤ect on laggards.
The reason why one e¤ect dominates when competition is low and the other when
competition is intense is the “composition e¤ect” on the steady-state distribution
of technology gaps.








In the limit when there is no competition (¼0 = ¼1), (2.14) implies that n0 = 0;
so that in the steady state the industry is always leveled (¹0 = 1), whereas when
there is the maximum competition (¼0 = ¼¡1), (2.14) and (2.16) imply that
n0 > n¡1; so that the overall rate of innovation in the leveled state is more than
twice that in the unleveled state and as a result the fraction of time ¹0 spent
leveled in steady state is less than 1/3.
2.9. Debt pressure and product market competition
In this subsection we explore the interplay between product market competition
and debt pressure indicators- such as debt-exposure (and the resulting probability
of incurring bankruptcy costs) and the magnitude of default costs (which one
19could interpret as re‡ecting the hardness of …rms’ budget constraints). We show
the possibility that higher debt pressure and/or higher default costs could induce
…rms to innovate more in order to escape debt pressure.
To formalizethe interplay between competition and the exposure tobankruptcy
costs, we consider the following variant of the basic one-step model: (1) neck-and-
neck pro…t ‡ows e ¼0 are random, i.i.d over time and uniformly distributed over the
interval [¼0;¼0+1]; (2) ¼¡1 ´ 0;¼1 constant with ¼1 >> ¼0+1; (3) …rms …nance
their investments through debt …nancing, which we de…ne here as involving a …xed
‡ow repayment obligation D; a ‡ow default cost f incurred per period of time by
the …rm whenever e ¼0 < D:13
Consider …rst the case where exit costs are negligible and where D 2 (¼0;¼0+
1); then, the Bellman equations for equilibrium R&D investments, can be ex-
pressed as:
rV1 = ¼1 ¡ D + n¡1(V0 ¡ V1);
rV0 = Ã(¼0;D;f) + n0(V1 ¡ V0) + n0(V¡1 ¡ V0) ¡ n
2
0=2;










is the expected ‡ow utility of a manager in a new industry, net of the expected
13This formulation is inspired from the costly state veri…cation literature (e.g Townsend
(1979), Gale-Hellwig (1985)) on debt-…nancing, in which …rms’ revenues are assumed to be
unveri…able by outside investors, unless they incur a ‡ow veri…cation cost f . For simplicity, we
abstract in this section from …rms’ choice over the optimal …nancial contract.
20veri…cation costs. From these Bellman equations and the corresponding …rst order
conditions, we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium neck-and-neck
…rm’s innovation rate:
n0 = ¡r +
p
r2 + 2(¼1 ¡ D ¡ Ã) = ¡r +
p
±; (2.18)




(¼0 + 1 ¡ D)




= ¡(¼0 + 1 ¡ D + f)=
p
± < 0: (2.19)
Suppose …rst that the default cost f is constant. Then, provided f is large




= (¼0 ¡D + f)=
p
±
which is positive if f > D¡¼0: Thus, for any level of PMC, higher debt pressure
as measured by a higher level of D will result in more R&D by neck and neck
…rms.
Consider next the e¤ect of an increase in the default cost f, which we interpret




that is, a higher cost of default induces …rms to innovate more in order to escape
the threat of bankruptcy.
213. The general model
In principle, one can solve the general model, but closed form solutions are hard
to derive when m is large, and the best one can do is to solve it numerically.
Figure 2 depicts the values as a function of ®, which we now use to parametrize
PMC, for the case where r = :1;° = 1:75;w = 1;¯ = 15: The larger ®; that is the
higher the degree of PMC, the higher the curvature of the logistic Vm function as
a function of m at the neighborhood of m = 0:
3.1. Industry innovation rate
Using the same equations, we can also characterize the relationship between ®
and the individual innovation rates nm and n¡m +h (where h is a help parameter
which re‡ects the fact that it might be easier for laggards than for leaders to go
one technological step forward): Figure 3 depicts the relationship between ® and
total intra-industry innovation rates (nm+ n¡m); for the above parameter values
and for h = 0:025: We see an inverted-U shaped pattern for m 6= 0, which in turn
results from the interplay between the “escape competition” and Schumpeterian
e¤ects of PMC on innovation incentives. We also see that innovation intensities
are higher and also increase more rapidly with ® in the case of neck-and-neck …rms.
Thus, there is complementarity between PMC and the degree of neck-and-neckness
as measured by how small m is. The relationship between PMC and innovation
becomes increasingly steeper as m goes down, i.e as the industry becomes more
neck-and-neck.
223.2. Industry structure and steady-state innovation/growth rates
In the equilibrium we de…ne ¹m to be the steady state fraction of time the industry




In addition, the following equations must also hold in steady-state:
¹m(nm + n¡m + h) = ¹m¡1nm¡1 + ¹m+1(n¡(m+1) + h);
for all m ¸ 2: The LHS of this equation represents the ‡ow probability of exit-
ing technological gap (or “state”) m; the RHS represents the ‡ow probability of
entering state m; both, from state (m ¡ 1) with the leader innovating, and from
state (m+ 1) sectors with the follower innovating. For m = 1 we have:
¹1(n1 + n¡1 + h) = 2¹0n0 + ¹2(n¡2 + h);
as two …rms instead of one can turn a neck-and-neck sector into an unleveled
sector with technological gap m = 1:
And for m = 0; we simply have:
2¹0n0 = ¹1(n¡1 + h):
In other words, a neck-and-neck sector becomes unleveled whenever a …rm in that
sector innovates, and only state-1 sectors can become neck-and-neck whenever the
laggard in that sector innovates. Figure 4 depicts ¹ as a function of m and ®.
We see that on average the industry becomes increasingly neck and neck as PMC
increases.
23Now, we can compute the average rate of productivity growth for the industry.
In the general case where the lead size m can take any integer value, one can show
that the average growth rate of the industry is equal to:




Equation (G) states that the growth rate equals the product of the frequency of
“frontier innovations” (innovations by the industry leader or a neck-and-neck …rm,
which advance the industry’s frontier technology) and the (log) size of innovations.
Figure 5 depicts g as a function of ®: We again obtain an inverted U-shape.
4. Summary of theoretical predictions
We now conclude the theoretical part of the paper by stating four main predictions
that came out of our analysis in the previous sections, and which we test in the
empirical part of the paper:
1. The relationship between product market competition and the average in-
novation rate, is an inverted-U shape.
2. The expected technological gap in an industry increases as product mar-
ket competition increases, that is the distribution shifts towards a lower
probability of being neck-and-neck.
3. There is a complementarity between product market competition and the
degree of neck-and-neckness of an industry. The closer …rms are in technol-
ogy space (the more neck-and-neck …rms are in that industry) the steeper
24the positive e¤ect of product market competition on innovation and the
larger the average number of innovations.
4. Firms with higher debt/cash-‡ow ratios may innovate more for any level of
PMC.
5. Data and Measurement Issues
The empirical investigation that we report in the next section is based on a panel
of UK companies covering the period 1968-1997. The UK over this period pro-
vides an extremely rich environment within which to study the impact of product
market competition on innovation behaviour. Not only is there a long panel of de-
tailed company data but this period also saw a number of signi…cant, and largely
exogenous, changes in product market competition. These changes, which altered
the structure of product market competition across industries, included the im-
plementation of the European Single Market Program, a series of structural and
behavioural reforms imposed on di¤erent industries as a result of investigations
by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) under the Fair Trading Act
and large scale privatisations. We document these in more detail below and relate
them carefully to our measure of industry level product market competition. We
will also argue that they provide a powerful set of instrumental variables for our
competitiveness measure.
There are two main data sources used in this study - …rm level accounting
data and administrative data from the US patents o¢ce.14 These allow us to
14This data was developed with funding from the Leverhulme Trust. See Bloom and Van
25combine information on technological performance, revenues, labour costs and
capital costs. The accounting data come from Datastream and include all …rms
quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 1968 and 1997.15 The …rm level
patenting information from the US Patent O¢ce dataset was matched to a subset
of the …rms for which accounting data is available. We have patents data for all
…rms with a name beginning A-L (plus all large R&D …rms) that were listed on
the London Stock Exchange any time between 1983 and 1985. These have been
matched to all of their subsidiaries in 1985.16 This data runs from 1968-1996 and
contains 461 …rms with 236 …rms that patent.
In order to test the predictions detailed in section 5 we need measures of …rms’
innovative output, the degree of product market competition in an industry, the
size of the technology gap between …rms within an industry (how “neck-and-neck”
…rms are) and the extent of bankruptcy threat facing each …rm. We will discuss
these in turn.
5.1. Measuring innovation
There is a large literature on measuring innovation intensity. The most commonly
used measures at the …rm level are research and development spending, patenting
activity, innovation counts and total factor productivity. Although R&D expen-
Reenen (2000) for a more detailed description of the data.
15We removed …rms with missing values on sales, capital or employment, …rms with less
than three consecutive observations, observations for …rms with abnormal length accounting
periods (we drop …rms whose accounting period falls outside 300 to 450 days due to changes
in accounting year ends) and exclude observations for …rms where there was a jump of greater
than 150% in any of the key variables (capital, labour, sales).
16This matching has been done by hand in order to achieve a higher match rate than with
computer matching.
26diture is available in the UK and we use it to check the robustness of our results,
it is not mandatory for …rms to report it, and prior to 1990 it is frequently not re-
ported. We do not use total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of innovative
activity either because of the well known problem that commonly used measures
of TFP are themselves biased in the presence of imperfectly competitive product
markets.17 For these reasons our main measure is based on information on patents
taken out by UK …rms in the US patent o¢ce. Our data includes information
on all patents taken out by a randomly selected sample of 461 UK stock market
listed …rms (all …rms with names beginning A-L).18
The US patenting o¢ce is the place where innovations are patented inter-
nationally. These patents can be based on research conducted anywhere in the
world. We also have information on citations to and from these patents. One
concern that is often expressed about using patent counts is that patents may not
be comparable across …rms or industries because their value can vary signi…cantly.
Therefore, we use the number of times a patent has been cited by other patents to
weight the patent and thus provide a measure that is more indicative of the value
of the patent.19 We can extend the interpretation of our results for patents to pro-
ductivity growth as patents are well known to have a strong e¤ect on productivity
growth.20 This has also been demonstrated directly for our dataset by Bloom and
17See, inter alia, Hall (1988), Klette and Griliches (1996) and Klette (1999).
18As we highlight below the complete set of UK stock market …rms is used to construct the
other industry measures we require.
19Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg et al. (2001) use the US Patent O¢ce patenting data set to
examine the e¤ects of patenting on the market value of US …rms.
20See for example the survey of the patenting literature in Griliches (1990).
27Van Reenen (2001) who …nd a highly signi…cant response of productivity to both
patents and patent citations. Figure 5.1 presents a frequency histogram of annual
…rms level patent count. This picture excludes the 37% of zero observations. It
also truncates the distribution at 50 patents per year per …rm. As we note further
below there are a few very large patenting …rms our data. The inclusion of …xed
e¤ects in our empirical model re‡ects the argument that certain …rms and certain
industries may have a higher propensity to patent than others and that this may
not be not causally related to the competitive structure of the …rm or industry.
5.2. Measuring the degree of product market competition
The degree of product market competition is measured at the industry level. We
use the …rm level data to construct these industry level measures. We use in-
formation reported in Datastream which we have for all UK stock market listed
…rms. As discussed in Section 2.3 our main indicator of product market competi-
tion is the Lerner Index or price cost margin. In fact we use 1 minus the Lerner,
so a value of 1 indicates perfect competition (price equals marginal cost) while
values below 1 indicate some degree of market power. This measure has several
advantages over measures such as market shares or a Her…ndahl or concentration
index. In order to measure any of those it is necessary to have a de…nition of
both the geographic and product boundaries of the market in which the …rm op-
erates. This is particularly important in our application as many innovative UK
…rms operate in international markets, so that traditional market concentration
28measures could be extremely misleading.21
In accordance with our theoretical measure the Lerner index is taken to be
constant within industry. Firms in our data can operate in many industries. We
classify …rms by the 2-digit SIC code in which the …rm had the largest proportion
of its sales in 1995. For 33% of the …rms this represented all of their sales. The
median share of sales accounted for by the largest industry is 90%. We use the
entire sample of Datastream …rms to estimate the industry Lerner Index. We
use accounting data to construct a …rm level measure similar to Nickell (1996)’s
measure of rents over value-added. The Lerner Index is price minus marginal cost
over price. One di¢culty we face is that we do not observe marginal cost. For
the numerator we use operating pro…ts net of depreciation and provisions. This





There are several concerns we might have about this measure. First, in UK
accounts capital depreciation, R&D expenditure and advertising have been de-
ducted. In theory we would like to deduct R&D depreciation (rather than expen-
diture), but this is not available and we note that in steady state investment in the
R&D stock should equal depreciation.22 Second, the assumption that AC ¼ MC
21One example of the di¢culties in using concentration indexes is provided by the pharma-
ceutical industry, which accounts for about 10% of global R&D. In the UK the pharmaceutical
industry is dominated by two large players, GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca, whose sales
accounts for about 65% and 30% of the market. But these …rms are global players, competing
with other US and European …rms. In global terms they have market shares of 7% and 4%,
with these low market shares re‡ect the …erce competition in the industry. In this case, without
global market sales, concentration measures would be extremely misleading.
22For growing …rms investment will be greater than depreciation so our estimate of Lerner
29assumes away any signi…cant …xed costs of production.23 We would like to de-
duced the …nancial cost of capital from the numerator, but we do not observe
this. In the empirical analysis we consider the robustness of our results to the
deduction of an estimate of the cost of …nance (cost of capital*capital) from our
measure of pro…ts.24
Our industry measure of product market competition, denoted cjt, is an un-
weighted average across all …rms in the industry,






where i indexes …rms, j indexes industry, t index time and Njt is the number of
…rms in industry j in year t.
We also use an alternative competition measure ® as described in (2.9). This
strips out the a¤ect of market share on a …rms’ pro…t-margin,
®it =
1 ¡liit
1 ¡ msit ¤ liit
We use the …rm’s share of output produced by …rms in the same 2-digit industry
on the London Stock Market to measure market share. This is not our prefered
measure because of our concerns about measuring market shares of …rms operating
in international markets, as discussed above. This adjustment and the results of
it are discussed further in the presentation of the empirical results. They also help
Index will be an underestimate of the true markup.
23More precisely, we assume that there is no correlation between signi…cant …xed costs and
innovation in our econometric approach which could lead us to erroneously …nd an inverted U
shape. We are grateful to Robert Barro for pointing this out.
24Where the cost of capital is assumed to be 0.085 for all …rms and time periods and capital
stock is measured using the perpetual inventory method.
30to back up the analysis in the Appendix which develops a theoretical argument
as to why the Lerner and ® should be inversely related even after allowing for
market share to adjust to changes in the competitive environment.
We are able to measure the Lerner index using information on all UK …rms
in Datastream, not only the sample for which we also observe patents. For …rms
operating in more than one market the Lerner Index will represent a weighted
average of the degree of product market competition across these markets. This
could lead to measurement error and attenuation bias. We discuss this further
in the empirical section below. Figure 5.2 presents the time path of the Lerner
index and our estimate of alpha for six of the manufacturing industries used
in the study.25 This shows a wide variation in the index over time that di¤ers
systematically across industries.
One of our main concerns is that the Lerner may be endogenous to the patent-
ing decision. We address this problem in a number of ways. Our main approach
is to use a number of ‘policy’ instruments that provide exogenous variation in the
degree of industry wide competition. These instruments are described below and
we show that their relationship to the Lerner suggests that the Lerner index is
picking up variation in industry wide product market competition. In the empir-
ical analysis we use the instruments to correct our estimators for endogeneity in
the Lerner index. All instrument sets include industry and time e¤ects. We also
use the lagged value of the Lerner index. Added to these are the set of policy
25Extraction of other minerals (23), Chemical industry (25), Manufacture of o¢ce machinery
(33), Electrical and electronic (34), Motor vehicles and parts (35), Food (41).
31instruments discussed in section 5.2.
Before using the Lerner in our detailed econometric analysis we consider the
extent to with the variation in our Lerner measure re‡ects changes in the degree
of competition. In order to do this we consider a set of major policy event that
a¤ected the degree of competition. These are of three sorts - the EU Single Mar-
ket Programme, Monopoly and Merger Commision investigations that resulted in
structural or behaviours remedies being imposed on the industry, and privatisa-
tions. The table below lists the sic codes and years a¤ect by these policies:
Policy instruments
SIC Years
SMP high see appendix 1988
SMP medium see appendix 1988
Cars 351 1984, 1987, 1988
Car Parts 353 1982, 1987
Periodicals 475 1987
Brewing 427 1986
Telecoms 344 1981, 1984, 1989
Textiles 430 1989
Razors and Razor blades 316 1990
Steel 220 1987
Ordnance 329 1987
In Appendix B we provide more detail on the policies and the industries that
were a¤ected.
5.3. Technology gap
We are also interested in looking at how the size of the technology gap between
…rms within an industry interacts with the degree of product market competition.
We measure this by the proportional distance a …rm is from the technological fron-
32tier, as measured by total factor productivity. This corresponds to the parameter





where F denotes the frontier (the highest TFP) and i denotes non-frontier …rms.





where F¡1 denotes the …rm just behind the frontier. A lower value of m indicates
that …rms are technologically close (so the industry is more neck and neck) while a
high value of m indicated a large technology gap, so the industry ismore unleveled.
In the empirical application below we use an industry level measure that is the









where Njt is the number …rms in industry j at time t. We measure TFP using
a …rst order approximation (Cobb-Douglas). We using information at on TFP
in the US, Japan and Germany at the industry-year level to capture the foreign
frontier.
5.4. Data description
Table 1 shows the number and proportion of observations where we have both
accounting and patents data and where we have only accounting data. On average
we observe patents data for 34% of the complete Datastream sample. We do not
33include industries where we have fewer than three …rms or where there were no
patents throughout the period 1968-1996. Our sample contains 330 …rms with
4,500 observations over the period 1971-1994 in seventeen 2-digit industries. Of
these there are 236 patenting …rms, with around 60,000 patents in total which
account for around 200,000 citations.
Table 2 shows the average of the …rm level Lerner Index for the sample of
…rms where we have only accounting data and for the sample where we have both
accounting and patents data. The table shows that the …rms we have in our
sample are similar in terms of their Lerner Index to those not in our sample -
both are used to construct our industry measure of the Lerner. At the industry
level the Lerner averages 8% and ranges from 21% in Extraction of other minerals
in 1976 to 3% in Motor Vehicles in 1981.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on our sample of 330 …rms. >From
this we can see that, …rstly, our patent count is highly skewed with most …rms
taking out no patents in any given year but one …rm (ICI in 1974) taking out
409 patents. Also, the employment …gures give an indicator of the size of our
…rms with about 1,500 employees in the median …rm, while the median of 17
observations per …rm re‡ects the long time series of our data set.
Our measure of the technology gap (neck and neck) also has a large spread
ranging from industries in which leaders and follower …rms all have very similar
levels of TFP (those with measures close to 0) to industries in which the leader
is far ahead of the rest of the industry (those with measures close to 1).
Our …nancial pressure variable is debt payments over operating pro…ts plus
34depreciation. This also shows a similarly large spread between …rms in which
debt repayments consume all their cash ‡ow (a pressure measure of 1) to those
with little or no debt (a pressure variable of 0).
6. Empirical Support for the Inverted U
Earlier analysis using UK company data (Blundell, Gri¢th and Van Reenen
1995,1999) established two empirical regularities. First, market share is a sig-
ni…cant positive determinant of innovation intensity at the …rm level even after
controlling for …xed e¤ects, for endogeneity of market share and for …rm size.
Second, industry competition measures, including industry concentration and im-
port penetration show positive and signi…cant competition e¤ects. This work also
found that at the industry level the competition e¤ect dominated. This concurs
with other empirical studies based on UK company data, in particular that by
Nickell (1996).
Our aim is to take this research forward by assessing the non-monotonicity of
the relationship between innovation intensity and product market competition.
6.1. A Method of Moments Estimator
The theoretical discussion in sections 2 and 3 generate a relationship between
product market competition and the innovation hazard. Denoting c as our mea-
sure of competition, we can express this as
n = e
g(c): (6.1)
35Suppose the patent process has a Poisson distribution with hazard rate (6.1). The
resulting count of patents in any time interval has the probability distribution




and the expected number of patents satis…es
E[pjc] = e
g(c): (6.3)
Parametric models that study count data processes typically base their speci-
…cation on this Poisson model with a known (linear) form for g(c) but relax the
strong variance assumption underlying (6.2).26 The Poisson MLE is a consistent
estimator in this case but overdispersion, common in innovation and patent data
sets, implies that the estimated variance covariance matrix is incorrect. To cor-
rect for this a heteroscedasticity corrected variance covariance matrix can be used
which adjusts for the presence of overdispersion.27 We follow this approach in our
empirical analysis but, because we are particularly interested in investigating the
shape of relationship between product market competition and patents, we adopt
a semiparametric generalisation.
In our data …rms i = 1;::::Nt are grouped into J mutually exclusive industries
with i 2 Ij with j = 1;:::;J . We observe …rms for t = 1;::::;Ti periods. Our
aim is to model average innovation behaviour by industry and relate it to the
competition measure. Our principle competition measure (cjt) is measured at the
industry level while patents (pit) are measured for each …rm. As noted above our
26See Griliches, Hall and Hausman(1984).
27See Blundell, Gri¢th and Windmeijer (1999).
36measure cjt is calculated using a larger sample (the population of Stock Market
listed …rms) than is used in estimation. Following from the speci…cation of the
conditional mean (6.3) we write
E[pitjcjt] = e
g(cjt) (6.4)
where g(c) is of unknown form. This directly identi…es the innovation hazard
(6.1). Note also that (6.4) is fully nonparametric but will be extended into a
semiparametric speci…cation as we introduce more conditioning variables into the
mean speci…cation.
It is very likely that …rms in di¤erent industries will have observed levels of
patenting activity that have no direct causal relationship with product market
competition but re‡ect other institutional features of the industry. Consequently
industry …xed e¤ects are essential to remove any spurious correlation or ‘endo-
geneity’ of this type. Time e¤ects are also included to remove common macro
shocks. Conditional on industry and time, average patent behaviour is related to





where xit represent a complete set of time and industry dummy variables.
The moment condition (6.5) can be used to de…ne an appropriate semipara-
metric estimator and in the analysis below we approximate g(c) with a polynomial
spline function.28 Given this speci…cation, and without introducing any …rm level
28See Ai and Chen (2001).
37covariates, moment condition (6.5) refers speci…cally to an industry level aver-
age relationship. However, we will include certain …rm level covariates in some
speci…cations, for example measures of …rm size and …rm level …xed e¤ects. Con-
sequently we will present all estimations using …rm level regressions.
Finally we note that our actual dependent variable is a citation weighted count
of patents. This is used so as to ‘correct’ the patent measure for the importance
of the innovation. We maintain the same mean speci…cation and same estimation
approach.
6.2. The Basic Inverted U Relationship
As we do not wish to impose any prior restrictions on the shape of g(c) in (6.5)
we begin our analysis using a polynomial spline. The result of this polynomial
spline regression without any conditioning variables is presented in Figure 6.1a.29
The two curves plotted in the …gure represent a quadratic spline30 and a simple
quadratic speci…cation for g(c). It is interesting to note that the simple quadratic
representation of g(c) provides a reasonable approximation and both speci…cations
show a clear inverted U. The underlying distribution of the data is shown by the
intensity of the points on the estimated curves. These indicate that the peak of
the inverted U lies towards the left of the median of the distribution (the median
is 0.92). The estimated coe¢cients for the quadratic model are presented in Table
4. As a further speci…cation check on the overall shape of this relationship we
29The relationship between citation weighted patents and 1 - Lerner is evaluated at the median
year and industry.
30With four evenly spaced knot points at 0.86, 0.89, 0.92 and 0.95.
38also present the simple kernel regression of p on c in Figure A6.1(a)31 once again
con…rming an inverted U shape.
[Table 4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 6.1b uses the same polynomial spline speci…cation as in Figure 6.1a but
includes the time and industry dummies. This displays an inverted U but with the
peak much shifted to the right. It also shows that the basic shape is robust to the
exclusion of these dummy variables. The direction of the shift is to be expected.
Industries that have a higher level of patenting may also be associated with more
concentrated …rms, biasing the results against the competitive story. Once we
condition on industry dummies the competition e¤ect comes in stronger. Figure
A6.1c in Appendix A presents the same curves with 95% con…dence bands. It is
clear that the inclusion of the time and industry e¤ects results in the (exponential)
quadratic providing a very close approximation which is not signi…cantly di¤erent
from the more ‡exible spline representation.
The inclusion of industry and time e¤ects makes the competition e¤ect on
innovation more pronounced. From Figure 6.1b we can see that a simple linear
relationship would yield a positive slope, clearly not the case in Figure 6.1a. This
analysis con…rms the results presented in Nickell (1996) which documents the
positive (linear) impact of industry level competition on innovation in a model
using …rm level UK data and including industry and time e¤ects.
31Using a kernel with bandwidth 0.025 and Gaussian weights. We also found a similar U
shape using Epanechnikov weights, which has its entire support lying within a …nite bandwidth
unlike the Gaussian Kernel.
39This inverted U relationship is also persevered when we consider each industry
separately. Figure 6.1c presents the relationship …tted separately for each of the
top four innovating industries in our sample. In each case there is an inverted U
shape with observations on either side of the peak.
In section 6.3 below we consider controlling for endogeneity in the Lerner
index using the instruments described in section 5.5. We show that the inverted
U is robust to endogeneity in the Lerner. In the remainder of this section we
consider a number of further robustness checks. First we control for the size of
the …rm by including beginning of period capital stock in the exponent term of the
conditional mean. Figure 6.2a shows that this does little to impact on the results.
Next we consider the impact of adjusting our Lerner measure of competition for
…xed capital costs. This is done by removing a factor proportional to the observed
value of capital stock in each …rm as described in section 5.2. Figure 6.2b presents
the results for this adjusted measure of industry competition. It shows precisely
the same shape - a clear inverted U. A key point here is that the entire curve
shifts to the right. Accounting for di¤erences in capital intensity does not change
the shape of the curve. As an additional check we consider removing the measure
of …rm market share from the Lerner index using the observed market share data
and the particular expression for ® implicit in the Lerner index (2.9). The results
are presented in Figure 6.2c and again the overall relationship remains in place.
In section 5.1 we noted that in the UK R&D expenditure was not widely
reported in …rms’ accounts before 1990. Nonetheless we use it as a robustness
check. We have 1,162 observations from 1980 - 1994. In 1980 only six …rms in our
40data reported R&D. From 1990 over 150 …rms report R&D. We estimate a model
of the form
ln(R&D)it = g(cjt) + x
0
it¯ + uit: (6.6)
Figure 6.2d plots the g (cjt) function as above, and shows that the inverted U
results is preserved.
Together these results seem to substantiate the …rst main prediction from the
theory.
6.3. Technological Gap and Product Market Competition.
The empirical analysis presented so far has studied the impact of product market
competition at the industry level on the level of patenting activity. We now look
at the importance of similarities in technology across …rms in the same industry -
de…ned by the size of the technology gap or the degree of neck and neckness. An
argument derived from the theoretical discussion in section 2 is that in equilibrium
the technology gap should be an increasing function of the overall level of industry
wide competition (so neck and neckness should be a decreasing function). This
constitutes the second of the main theoretical predictions.
To measure the technological gap within any industry at any point in time,
we use a measure the distance of each …rm from the frontier …rm as described in
section 5.3. We label this measure m, a lower value of m indicates that the tech-
nological gap is smaller (so …rms are more neck and neck). Figure 6.3 presents a
kernel smoothed plot of m for each industry time observation against the industry
41competition index. This shows a strongly positive relationship as predicted by the
theory.
A further theoretical prediction concerns the form of the inverted U shape
relationship among those industries where the technology gap is small. This is
the third of the predictions listed in section 4. To assess this we split our sample
into those with above median technological gap and those below - these are called
less neck and neckness and more neck and neck respectively. Figure 6.4 presents
a picture of the same quadratic speci…cation as in Figure 6.1b but with this split.
For comparison the quadratic speci…cation in Figure 6.1b is also reproduced and
is represented by the thin line. Two features stand out clearly. First, more
neck and neck industries have a higher level of innovation activity. Second, the
inverted U shape is still pronounced in both groups. It is steeper for the more
neck and neck industries, and we can see that the density lies more to the left
of peak in more neck and neck industries. This accords well with the theoretical
simulations presented in section 3. These di¤erences and the overall shape are
highly signi…cant as can be seen from the con…dence bands presented in Figure
A6.4 in Appendix A.
6.4. Endogeneity
The inclusion of industry and time e¤ects may not be su¢cient to remove all spu-
rious correlation between the competition measure and the average patent count.
These dummies remove unobservable time and industry level e¤ects, so all that
could remain are relative changes in the competition measure across industries
42in the UK that are indirectly caused by shocks to UK patents. To remove such
temporal correlation we use the policy instruments described in section 5.2. In
addition we include a full set of time and industry e¤ects and also consider the use
of lagged values of the Lerner index. These turn out to be good instruments in
the sense that they are strongly correlated with the UK industry level competing
measure we use.
We adopt a control function approach.32 This di¤ers from standard IV (and
GMM) in nonlinear models.33 The idea isto use functions of the residuals fromthe
regression of the competition index on the instruments as controls in an extended
version of the moment condition.






Exogeneity of c and x implies
E[uitjcjt;xjt] = 1 (6.8)
resulting in the moment condition (6.5). Under endogeneity of c this moment
condition on uit no longer holds. However, we assume we have instruments zit
that obey the reduced form
cjt = ¼(zjt) + x
0
it° + vjt (6.9)
32See Newey, Powell and Vella (1998).
33See Blundell and Powell (2001).
43with
E[vitjzit;xjt] = 1 (6.10)
The control function assumption34 states
E[uitjcjt;xjt;vit] = 1 (6.11)
so that controlling for vit in the conditional moment condition is su¢cient to






The assumption being that inclusion of some function of the reduced form resid-
uals vjt; say just ½vjt; is su¢cient to remove all spurious correlation and recover
the correct structural relationship g(c):35 More precisely, we can integrate over










Empirically this is achieved using the empirical distribution for v.36
For the exponential quadratic speci…cation of g we generalize this slightly by
including the reduced formresiduals for the linear and quadratic termin c: Indeed,
if the model were quadratic ratherthan exponential quadratic this approach would
34See Blundell and Powell (2001).
35The inclusion of control function terms in a grouped regression model with group and time
dummies as a method of dealing with endogeneity is discussed further in Blundell, Duncan and
Meghir (1998).
36See Blundell and Powell (2001).
44recover exactly the standard instrumental variable estimator for the quadratic
model using the instruments zit. A simple test for endogeneity, conditional on the
time and …xed e¤ects xjt; is given by H0 : ½ = 0:37
6.5. Endogeneity Results
There are two sources of endogeneity we consider. The …rst concerns the Lerner
index itself. For this we use the policy instruments detailed in section 5.5. We also
include measures of R&D intensity in the US and in France matching by industry.
These instruments work well. The p-values for the instruments in the reduced
form regressions for the Lerner index and the Lerner index squared are presented
in Table 4. The policy instruments can be seen to play a direct and signi…cant
role. The impact on our results of controlling for endogeneity in the Lerner index
using the control function approach and these instruments is presented in Figure
6.5a. This is directly comparable with Figure 6.4 but now all lines are adjusted for
endogeneity using this control function approach. If anything the results are now
strongerwith a clear inverted U and a much strongerimpact of overall competition
for industries where …rms are close in technology space. These di¤erences remain
signi…cant as can be seen from the con…dence bands presented in Figure A6.5a.
A further source of endogeneity may come from the neck and neck split. To
allow for this we follow a similar control function approach. As instruments we use
the following instruments: (i) Imports from the OECD over output in France and
the USA, varies over industry and time, levels and squared terms. (ii) Output
37See Blundell and Smith (1986).
45minus costs over output in France and the USA, varies by industry and time,
levels and squared terms. (iii) Estimate of markup from Martins et al (1996) for
France and the USA, varies by industry, interacted with time trend. (iv) TFP
in France and the USA, varies by industry and time, levels and squared terms.
(v) R&D over output in France and the USA, varies by industry and time, levels
and squared terms.The impact of controlling for the endogeneity of the sample
separation between high and low neck and neck industries is presented in Figure
6.5b. The strong positive impact of high neck and neck industries is further
increased and the inverted U shape remains.
6.6. Financial pressure
Our fourth theoretical prediction is that higher debt pressure should reinforce
the escape competition e¤ect of PMC and thereby enhance innovation incentives
especially at lower levels of PMC. We use a measure of …rms’ debt to cash ‡ow
ratio, as described in section 5.4, to split …rms. We identify the 40% of …rms
with the highest debt payments to cash ‡ow ratio as “high” and compare those
to “low” debt to cash ‡ow …rms. In Figure 6.6a we show the relationship between
product market competition and these two groups, as before the solid line is as
shown in Figure 6.1b. We have allowed the intercept and the coe¢cients on the
Lerner and Lerner squared to vary across the groups. First, we notice that …rms
with higher …nancial pressure innovate more on average than those with lower
…nancial pressure, as predicted by the theory. Secondly, we note that the escape
competition e¤ect dominates over a larger range of values for the Lerner for high
46…nancial pressure …rms, again, as predicted by the theory.
In Figure 6.6b we control for potential endogeneity of the Lerner as described
above. Our …ndings are robust to these controls.
7. Conclusions
This paper provides a …rst attempt at confronting theory with data on the rela-
tionship between product market competition and the innovation rate. Our em-
pirical results con…rm the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
product market competition and innovations, which in turn indicates that some
kind of an “escape competition” e¤ect should dominate at lower levels of PMC as
measured by the Lerner index, whereas the “Schumpeterian e¤ect” pointed out
in earlier endogenous growth models and before that in the IO literature, should
dominate at high initial levels of PMC. Our results also indicate a similar inverted
U-shaped relationship at the industry level, and that it tends to be steeper for
…rms that are more neck-and-neck and/or that are closer to the leading-edge in
their industry. Finally, we …nd that …rms facing a higher threat of bankruptcy
are subject to a stronger escape competition e¤ect and innovate more on average,
especially at lower levels on competition.
We plan to extend our analysis in two directions. The …rst is to examine
more carefully the timing of the changes in product market competition and their
impact on innovation. This will cover two aspects of dynamics. One is the dy-
namics of the production process of innovations (e.g. incorporating adjustment
costs or an error correction component) and the other to consider the history and
47institutional aspects of speci…c industries.
The second extension would be to introduce entry and entry threat as alterna-
tive (or complementary) measures of competition. This again would be done using
an extension of the above model with entry and exit in any industry. Preliminary
simulations performed on this extended model suggest: (i) an inverted U-shaped
relationship between potential entry and the innovation rate; (ii) a strategic com-
plementarity between entry and PMC, in the sense that the escape competition
e¤ect of PMC on the aggregate innovation/growth rate, appears to be stronger
the higher the level of entry.
488. Appendix A
Here we provide the details of two reasons for believing that, according to the
theory outlined in the …rst part of the paper, the average Lerner index of a random
sample of …rms in an industry should be a decreasing function of the ® measure
of competition.
The …rst reason is that for the special case when ° is close to 1 then the average
of the 2 Lerner indexes in an industry with any lead size m is well approximated
by
1¡®
1¡®=2, which is the Lerner of a neck-and-neck …rm and is strictly decreasing in
®: The proof of this proposition goes as follows.









where ¸(z;®) is the market share of a …rm with relative cost z, de…ned implicitly





because ¸(1;®) = 1=2: So suppose m 7 0: Taking a Taylor expansion around
° = 1 and de…ning " ´ ° ¡ 1, we have:
Lm = L0 ¡ "m
@e L(z;®)
@z






Therefore the average of the two …rms’ Lerner indexes is:












So, when gamma is small, whatever the distribution of m, the expected Lerner
of a randomly selected …rm is approximately the same decreasing function of
alpha.
The second reason is that even when ° is not small, when you sample …rms
whose lead sizes are distributed according to the steady state distribution ¹ of the
49theory, numerically the expected value of the randomly selected …rm is a decreas-
ing function of ®: This is illustrated below in Figure A1, which plots the expected
value of a …rm’s Lerner index under the distribution ¹ against the industry’s ®:
The parameter values are the same as those underlying Figures 2 s 5 in the text.
Figure A1 also plots the approximate value 1¡®
1¡®=2 analyzed in the preceding para-
graphs, which continues to be the actual Lerner index of a neck-and-neck …rm, and
which continues to approximate the theoretical prediction of the average Lerner
fairly closely when ® is small.
9. Appendix B: Policy instruments
9.1. Single Market Program
The EU Single Market Programme (SMP) is used as an exogenous policy in-
strument that a¤ected the degree of product market competition. The aims of
the SMP were to bring down internal barriers to the free movement of goods,
services, capital and labour. The European Commission’s White Paper (1985)
outlined around three hundred speci…c measures which were designed to achieve
this.
Mayes and Hart (1994) summarise these measures into six main areas of ac-
tion: (1) uni…ed market in goods and services, (2) uni…ed factor market, (3)
promotion of competition, (4) monetary integration, (5) social protection, and
(6) united response to external challenges. The measures included harmonising
indirect taxes, standards, border controls, lowering the barriers which enable …rms
to segment markets, thus increasing both the size of the markets and the intensity
of competition (e.g. remove nationality requirements, common competition pol-
icy, removal of other non-tari¤ barriers); removal of public sector discrimination in
favour of its own …rms; reducing the cost of capital and labour by permitting free
‡ow across countries and to assist the process of structural change by investing in
infrastructure, technology and human skills (see Burridge and Mayes (1992)).
The measures that were aimed at promoting competition include instituting
common rules on regulation, takeovers, state assistance to industry, patents and
copyrights, company accounting and disclosure of information, opening up of pub-
50lic procurement to competitive tender and reducing intervention in agriculture.
This wide range of measures impacted upon di¤erent industries di¤erentially. The
Cecchini report attempted to quantify the size of non-tari¤ barriers in existence
before the SMP was implemented. They use a series of surveys and technical
papers to assign numerical values to the size of non-tari¤ barriers in each indus-
try before the SMP. Industries are divided into three categories by the Cecchini
report (the classi…cation used here is from Mayes and Hart (1994, p53) of 3-digit
industries that were likely to be a¤ected by the SMP):
(i) barriers were low pre-SMP so the impact of the SMP was expected to be
low,
(ii) an intermediate level of barriers pre-SMP and where the measures under-
taken as part of the SMP were expected to signi…cantly reduce them:
247 Glass
248 Refractory and ceram





327 Machinery for wood,
346 Domestic electric ap
347 Electric lamps
351 Motor vehicles and e
352 Motor vehicle bodies
353 Motor vehicle parts
427 Brewing and malting
428 Soft drinks
431 Woollen






(iii) those where there were high level of barriers pre-SMP and the SMP was
expected to signi…cantly reduce them:
256 Specialised chemical
257 Pharmaceutical produ
325 Mining and construct
326 Power transmission e
328 Other machinery
330 O¢ce machinery
330 Manufacture of o¢c
341 Insulated wires
342 Basic electrical equ
344 Telecomm equipment
345 Other electronic equ
361 Shipbuilding




421 Ice cream chocolate
491 Jewellery
494 Toys and games
The initial SMP programme was announced in 1986 and implementation was
scheduled to take place starting in 1988 and be completed by 1992 (although
not all proposals had been implemented by 1992). Thus three time periods are
considered:
PRE 1980-1987, pre-SMP
DUR 1988-1992, during implementation of SMP
AFT 1993-1996, after SMP implemented
Gri¢th (2001) uses plant level data in the UK to show that the impact of the
SMP was to increase product market competition (bring down the Lerner Index)
52in those industries that were expected ex ante to be a¤ected. Markups in the
intermediate industries came down by around 5% and in the industries with high
barriers they came down by over 10%.
9.2. Cars
MMC (1982) reported on the possible existence of a complex monopoly in the
wholesale supply of car parts. The report concluded that car manufacturers and
importers restricted competition by requiring persons to whom they supplied car
parts to acquire them exclusively from them or from sources approved by them.
This limited the extent to which component manufacturers could compete with
each other and with car manufacturers and importers, restricted price competi-
tion, imposed some limitation on the level of services from which the franchised
sector could bene…t, and restricted competition among factors. An Order38 was
subsequently approved making it unlawful for car manufacturers and importers
to insist on their franchised dealers buying car parts exclusively from them.
There were four major privatisations in the car industry. Jaquar, a luxury car
maker, was sold in 1984 (…xed price o¤er of 100% of shares). Unipart, a suppiler of
parts and accessories to Rover, was sold in a mangement buyout in 1987. Leyland,
a manufacturer of buses, trucks and vans, was sold in 1987 (combination of a
management buyout and sale to existing …rms). Rover, a vehicle manufacturer,
was sold to British Aerospace in 1988.
9.3. Periodicals
MMC (1988) found that publishers of specialist magazines intended for campers
climbers and walkers refused to accept advertisements containing prices and that
this constituted a complex monopoly. The adverse e¤ects were thought to be:
(a) hindering or preventing readers’ informed choice, (b) restriction of competi-
tion between specialist retailers and mail order companies, (c) narrowing of price
38HC Hansard 24, 26-May-82, c 314-315 ORDERS SI 1982 : 1146 The Restriction On Agree-
ments (Manufacturers And Importers Of Motor Cars) Order
53ranges and increase of average price level. An Order39 prohibiting such actions
was implemented.
9.4. Brewing
MMC (1989) found a complex monopoly in the brewing industry. The adverse
e¤ects were identi…ed as: a) inhibition of new entry; b) reduced competition; c)
higher or discriminatory prices; d) reduced consumer choice; e) restrictions on
the independence of tenants of pubs; f) pricing structure which adversely a¤ected
wholesalers.
Action taken40 requiring national brewers to free half of their premises in
excess of 2000 from ties. This meant that pubs were able to choose a guest beer.
This applied to all brewers ensuring easy exit from loan ties, requiring brewers to
supply beer at maximum published wholesale prices, and stopped brewers selling
premises with conditions that prevented them from being used as a pub in the
future. There was a review of the licensing system to see whether magistrates
should in future only take account of whether applicants are ”…t and proper.
Following consultation with the EC two Orders were passed. The Tied Estate
Order was concerned with measures applying to national brewers, in particular
national brewers were required to free half of their premises in excess of 2,000
from ties by 1.11.92, also, all those tied by national brewers, whether through loan
ties or tenancies, were to be free to choose a guest beer, low alcohol beer, soft
drinks and some other drinks from any source by 1.5.90. The Loan Ties, Licensed
Premises and Wholesale Prices Order applied to all brewers and ensured easy exit
from loan ties, required brewers to supply beer at maximum published wholesale
prices and stopped brewers selling premises with conditions that prevented them
from being used as pubs in the future. The impact of these orders on …rms pricing
behaviour has subsequently been studied by Slade (2001).
39ORDERS SI 1988 : 1017 The Restriction on Conduct (Specialist Advertising Services)
Order
40ORDERS SI 1989 : 2258 The Supply of Beer (Loan Ties, Licensed Premises and Wholesale
Prices) Order; SI 1989 : 2390 The Supply of Beer (Tied Estate) Order.
549.5. Telecoms
Cable and Wireless, a major international telecommunications company, was pri-
vatised in 1981. This happened through a …xed price o¤ering of 49.4% of its shares
in 1981, a tender o¤er of an additional 22.3% in 1983 and a further …xed price
o¤er of 22.7% in 1985.
MMC (1989) investigated the the proposed acquisition of The Plessey Com-
pany plc by a company jointly owned by The General Electric Company. plc
(GEC) and Siemens AG. The MMC allowed the merger but found adverse e¤ects
in the form of a reduction of competition. The MMC recommended that GEC not
be allowed to acquire control of some parts of Plessey’s activities which should
pass to Siemens only.
GECand Siemens undertook41 a) that GEC would not acquire any control over
Plessey’sradarand military communicationsbusinessand tra¢c control activities;
b) that arrangements for the ownership and management of Plessey’s defence,
R&D, and semiconductor businesses would be made to comply with national
security requirements; c) that access to technologoy and licences for production




and the Tootal Group Plc (Tootal). The …rst involved Coat’s further acquisition
of Tootal equity which raised its holding to 29.9 per cent, the second involved an
o¤er for all Tootal’s issued share capital. The impact of these proposed mergers
was found to have adverse e¤ects through: a) reduction in competition; b) higher
prices; c) reduced consumer choice. The merger was allowed but Coats under-
took42 to dispose of its interest in the UK supply of domestic sewing thread and
in Gutermann & Co. Until these disposals Coats undertook to exercise no more
41ORDERS SI 1989 : 27 The Merger Reference (GEC, Siemens and Plessey) Order.
42ORDERS SI 1989 : 1054 The Merger Reference (Coats Viyella PLC and Tootal Group
PLC) Order.
55than 9.9 percent of its voting rights in Tootal.
9.7. Razors
MMC (1991a,b) relate to concurrent references to the Commission concerning
the situation arising from a leveraged buy-out of the Consumer Products (CP)
division of Stora, which included the Wilkinson Sword business, using a shelf
company to be called Swedish Match. Finance for the transaction was to be
provided by a number of Swedish investor institutions together with the Gillette
company and its subsidiaries. The reports concluded that a monopoly situation
existed in favour of Gillette UK and that the a¤ect of Gillette’s involvement in the
transaction, speci…cally the giving of assistance to and the provision of …nance for
Swedish Match in connection with a buy-out, was to weaken the competitiveness
of its main competitor in the United Kingdom, to strengthen its competitive
position, and to reduce competition. This would result in prices being higher
than they would otherwise be and a reduction in consumer choice. The reports
recommended that Gillette UK should dispose of its equity interests.43
9.8. Steel
British Steel, the largest UK steel producer, was privatised in 1987 through a
…xed price o¤er of 100% of its shares.
9.9. Ordnance
Royal Ordnance, manufacturer of artillery, ammunition, explosives, ordnance,
small arms and rocket motors, sold to British Aerospace in 1987.
43ORDERS SI 1991 : 750 The Merger Situation (Stora/Swedish Match/Gillette) (Interim
Provision) Order SI 1993 : 1703 The Merger Situation (Stora/Swedish Match/Gillette) (Interim
Provision) (Revocation) Order.
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As competition decreases, the equilibrium profit level 
π 0 of neck-and-neck firms increases, resulting 







Figure 2: How a firm’s value depends on its technogical lead and on the 





Figure 3: Total Industry R&D as a function of the technological gap between leader
 and follower and of the degree of product market competition.0  alpha 
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Figure 4: The cross-industry distribution of technological gaps 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Patents (0 < p <  50) 
Notes: Excluding zeros (37%) and counts over 50 per year.Figure 5.2: Alpha compared to 1-Lerner
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Quadratic and spline with year and industry effects
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Exponential Quadratic with firm capital, year and industry effects
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Quadratic with year and industry effects
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20Figure 6.3: Composition effect
Notes: Kernel regression, bw = .05, k = 6
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Neck and neck split with year and industry effects
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Neck and neck split with year and industry effects
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1-LernerFigure 6.6a: Financial  pressure split
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15Figure 6.6b: Financial  pressure split, controlling for endogeneity of Lerner using control function
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10Figure A6.1a: Kernel Regression
Kernel regression, bw = .025, k = 6
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Quadratic and spline with year and industry dummies
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Quadratic with year and industry effects
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0Table 1: Distribution of observations with patents data by industry 





22 Metal manufacturing  155  123  278 
                       55.76  44.24  100.00 
23 Extraction of other  17  34  51 
                       33.33  66.67  100.00 
24 Non-Metallic Mineral  320  200  520 
                       61.54  38.46  100.00 
25 Chemicals  222  348  570 
                       38.95  61.05  100.00 
31 Manufacture of metal  210  273  483 
                       43.48  56.52  100.00 
32 Mechanical engineering  917  783  1700 
                       53.94  46.06  100.00 
33 Office & Computing  72  31  103 
                       69.90  30.10  100.00 
34 Electrical and electronic  554  484  1038 
                       53.37  46.63  100.00 
35 Motor vehicles  318  210  528 
                       60.23  39.77  100.00 
36 Manufacture of other  133  117  250 
                       53.20  46.80  100.00 
37 Instrument engineering  45  48  93 
                       48.39  51.61  100.00 
41 Food manufacture  209  112  321 
                       65.11  34.89  100.00 
42 Sugar Beverages &   329  259  588 
                       55.95  44.05  100.00 
43 Textiles  458  310  768 
                       59.64  40.36  100.00 
45 Footwear and cloth  397  0  397 
                       100.00  0.00  100.00 
46 Wood Products & Furniture  300  0  300 
                       100.00  0.00  100.00 
47 Paper and Paper Products  564  241  805 
                       70.06  29.94  100.00 
48 Rubber & Plastic   146  117  263 
                       55.51  44.49  100.00 
49 Other manufacturing  227  51  278 
                       81.65  18.35  100.00 
Total  9418  4523  13941 
                       67.56  32.44  100.00 
  
Table 2: Lerner index and patent counts by industry 
  Average firm level Lerner Index   





Average number of 
annual patents 
14 Mineral oil processing  0.074    0 
22 Metal manufacturing  0.060  0.053  13 
23 Extraction of other minerals  0.153  0.183  9 
24 Non-Metallic Mineral Products  0.077  0.114  40 
25 Chemicals  0.092  0.100  330 
31 Manufacture of metal goods  0.082  0.068  2 
32 Mechanical engineering  0.074  0.076  55 
33 Office & Computing Machinery  0.133  0.111  8 
34 Electrical and electronic 
engineering 
0.090  0.093  145 
35 Motor vehicles  0.045  0.061  167 
36 Manufacture of other  0.071  0.095  36 
37 Instrument engineering  0.106  0.077  4 
41 Food manufacture  0.060  0.068  15 
42 Sugar Beverages & Tobacco  0.104  0.091  113 
43 Textiles  0.062  0.075  3 
45 Footwear and clothing  0.078    0 
46 Wood Products & Furniture  0.077    0 
47 Paper Paper Products & Printing  0.092  0.085  3 
48 Rubber & Plastic Products  0.104  0.066  4 
49 Other manufacturing  0.080  0.088  14 
Total  0.077  0.079   
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean 
(s.d) 
Median  Min  Max 
Patents  7.45 
(30.77) 
0  0  409 
Cite weighted patents  7.45 
(30.05) 
0  0  392 
(1-Lerner)  0.91 
(0.025) 
0.91  0.79  0.97 
Employment (1000s)  11 
(28.8) 
1.5  0.04  312 
Observations per firm  15.7 
(5.34) 
17  5  22 
Technology gap (m)  0.80 
(0.189) 
0.89  0.004  0.98 
Financial pressure  0.066 
(2.85) 
0.15  0  1 
 Table 4a: Regression results 












Observations  3248  3248  2662  3248  3248  1162 
             

























             
Significance 
of: 
           
2 , jt jt c c   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0457 
Year effects  -  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0076 
Industry 
effects 
-  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Significance test shows P-value from 
2 c  test of joint significance. 
Figure 6.1a: Quadratic and spline with no controls 
Figure 6.1b: Quadratic and spline with year and industry effects 
Figure 6.2a: Conditioning on firm level capital stock 
Figure 6.2b: Quadratic with year and industry effects, with Lerner corrected for fixed costs 
Figure 6.2c: Using alpha rather than 1-Lerner 
Figure 6.2d: Using R&D instead of patents (1980-1994; main sample 1990-1994) Table 4b: Regression results 





Figure 6.5a  Figure 6.5b 
  high  low  -  high  low  high  low 
  1288  1960  2491  926  1565  926  1565 
               





























               
Significance of:               
2 , jt jt c c   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
year effects  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
industry effects  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
instruments in 
reduced form for 
jt c  
    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
instruments in 
reduced form for 
2
jt c  
    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
instruments in 
reduced form for 
split 
-  -  -  -  0.0000 
control functions 
in regression 
-    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
               
R
2 of reduced form 
for  jt c  
    0.8649  0.8667  0.8649 
R
2 of reduced form 
for 
2
jt c  
    0.8668  0.8685  0.8668 
R
2 of reduced form  -  -  -  -  0.5433 
Notes: Significance test shows P-value from 
2 c  test of joint significance. Excluded 
variables are: policy instruments discussed in section 5.2, imports over value-added in 
same industry-year in USA and France, TFP in same industry-year in USA and France, 
output minus variable costs over output in same industry-year in USA and France, 
estimate of markup from industry-country regression for USA and France (Martins et al 
1996) interacted with time trend. 
Figure 6.4: Neck and neck  split (by TFP) 
Figure 6.5a: Neck and neck  split, controlling for endogeneity of Lerner using control function 
Figure 6.5b: Neck and neck  split, controlling for endogeneity of Lerner and split using control function   
Table 4c: Regression results 
Figure:  Figure 6.6a  Figure 6.6b 
  2662  2662 
     






















     
Significance of:     
2 , jt jt c c   0.0000  0.0000 
year effects  0.0000  0.0000 
industry effects  0.0000  0.0000 
instruments in reduced form for  jt c     0.0000 
instruments in reduced form for 
2
jt c     0.0000 
control functions in regression    0.0000 
     
R
2 of reduced form for  jt c     0.8550 
R
2 of reduced form for 
2
jt c     0.8570 
Notes: Significance test shows P-value from 
2 c  test of joint significance. Excluded 
variables are: policy instruments discussed in section 5.2, imports over value-added in 
same industry-year in USA and France, TFP in same industry-year in USA and France, 
output minus variable costs over output in same industry-year in USA and France, 
estimate of markup from industry-country regression for USA and France (Martins et al 
1996) interacted with time trend. 
Figure 6.6a: Financial  pressure split 
Figure 6.6b: Financial  pressure split, controlling for endogeneity of Lerner using control function 